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ABSTRACT 
The nature and performance of reverse mergers 
Chi Sun 
I compare a sample of reverse mergers between 1995 and 2006 with comparable mergers 
of public firms and acquisitions of public targets by private firms. I find that reverse 
merger and going private transactions target firms with different characteristics. The short 
horizon stock price performance upon announcement of reverse mergers is correlated 
with the termination fee and time to effectuate the transaction. Finally, consistent with 
prior research, reverse mergers result in long-run stock price underperformance. However, 
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I. Introduction 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) became possibly the most well known 
example of a reverse merger when, on April 21, 2005, it announced its plan to go public 
via a reverse merger with Archipelago Holdings Inc. Such a reverse merger (RM) 
combines elements of an initial public offering (IPO) as well as a merger in that it permits 
a private firm to go public through a merger rather than an offering of shares.1 Since the 
early 1980s, the reverse merger has become an increasingly popular way for private firms 
to access the capital markets.2 However, although IPOs and mergers have been 
extensively analyzed by researchers, reverse mergers, which combine elements of both, 
are not as well understood. A notable exception is the work of Gleason, Rosenthal and 
Wiggins (2005), who find that reverse mergers are followed by poor operating 
performance. They also find that a substantial number of firms undertaking reverse 
mergers do not survive for two years. They conclude that reverse mergers may have 
failed to generate value for shareholders. 
The analysis of Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005), like much of the existing 
research on reverse mergers, focuses exclusively on a comparison of reverse mergers 
with similar IPOs.3 To the best of my knowledge, there have been no research studies that 
have examined reverse mergers by comparing them to other mergers. Yet, a reverse 
merger has as much in common with mergers as it does with IPOs. This raises two 
potential concerns with existing research. First, a comparison with IPOs would tend to 
1
 In order to differentiate them, I will refer to mergers that are not reverse mergers as "regular mergers" 
2
 Gleason, Jain and Rosenthal (2005) report three reverse mergers between 1984 and 1989, 40 between 
1990 and 1995, and 75 between 1996 and 2001. 
3
 Others who have worked on this topic include, Arellano-Ostoa and Brusco (2002), Gleason Jain and 
Rosenthal (2005) and Adjei, Cyree and Walker (2008). 
1 
ignore certain deal specific features that influence the performance of reverse mergers. In 
support of this I find that the abnormal returns associated with a reverse merger are 
significantly negatively related to termination fees and the time between the 
announcement date and the effective date of the merger. In contrast the relationship 
between termination fee and announcement returns is insignificant for regular mergers. 
My findings complement those of Officer (2003) and suggest that termination fees play a 
different role in reverse mergers than they do in regular mergers. 
Second, the conclusions based on a comparison of RMs with IPOs could be 
misleading in that acquiring firms in reverse mergers will share the characteristics of a 
regular merger as much as other types of mergers. I propose to remedy this shortcoming 
by testing the performance of reverse mergers against a benchmark of regular mergers 
and going private (GP) transactions.4 Although I am unable to uncover any significant 
difference in short horizon abnormal returns for reverse mergers, I find that over 1 2 - 3 6 
months, the stock price performance of reverse mergers trails that of comparable regular 
mergers. In addition, the operating performance of firms participating in reverse mergers 
is poorer than that showed by comparable public merging firms. The evidence suggests 
that although RM firms are not initially penalized by the market, they have delivered 
poor returns over the longer term. Finally, private firms that acquire public firms in 
reverse mergers appear to have higher leverage and less cash than their public 
counterparts.5 Overall, my findings are largely consistent with existing research in that I 
find that RMs result in poor long term performance. However, the magnitude of the 
4
 Going private transactions are defined as ones in which a private firm or a group of investors acquires a 
public firm and the merged entity is not publicly traded. 
5
 From here on, I refer to the private firm involved in a reverse merger as the acquirer and the public firm as 
the target. 
2 
underperformance is small. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
defines and describes the features of a reverse merger. Section 3 examines the merits of 
analyzing RMs against a benchmark of mergers. Section 4 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 5 explains the data and the sample selection method. Section 6 discusses the 
methodology and results. Section 7 concludes this paper. 
II. What is Reverse Merger? 
2.1. Definition 
In a reverse merger, a private firm acquires a public firm, and through the acquisition, 
it obtains listing in a specific stock exchange. Thus, public firms listed in New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and other major stock 
exchanges, as well as those listed in Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) or Pink 
Sheets are possible targets for private firms seeking RM opportunities. Although RM 
transactions can typically be completed in a matter of weeks, many take months or even 
years to complete. As in a regular merger, the public firm in a RM is required to submit 
relevant filings, such as 8-Ks to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the 
submission of paperwork must be completed two weeks before the transaction closes. A 
RM can be considered completed when the private firm controls the majority of the 
public firm's shares. Usually, the transaction involves the reorganization of former public 
firm with respect to its capital structure, ownership structure, and board composition. 
3 
2.2. The reverse merger process 
A RM is commonly undertaken through a process called "Reverse Triangular 
Merger", especially for those public companies traded in OTC or Pink Sheet. A typical 
Reverse Triangular Merger consists of several steps: 
1) The public firm creates a wholly owned shell subsidiary; 
2) This subsidiary is then merged into the private firm; 
3) The subsidiary is the surviving firm nominally, while it is the shareholders of the 
(former) private company that control the surviving subsidiary; 
4) Shares of the private firm are exchanged for shares of the public firm. This step is 
the key step whereby the public company (parent) issues new shares in exchange 
for shares in the private firm (subsidiary). The newly issued shares will typically 
account for a majority (greater than 50%) of all diluted outstanding shares of the 
public firm. 
5) The private firm becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the public company 
while the shareholders of the (former) private firm own the majority of the now 
merged public firm's shares. 
6) In a later phase, the public firm may replace its board members and management 
team with those of the private firm. 
4 
Although RMs can be structured through a direct merger, in which the former public 
firm directly merges with the private firm, the "Reverse Triangular Merger" can be a way 
to lower the costs of finalizing the merger.6 
2.3. Advantages offered by reverse mergers 
IPOs, as opposed to RMs, result in directly raising fund by issuing stocks. In contrast, 
RMs take two steps to get to the same place as IPOs. First, the RM firm buys and merges 
with a public shell company and obtains the public listing; second, the merged entity 
arranges for investors to purchase its stock or raises financing through alternative means. 
These could include debt financing, factoring arrangements, traditional private 
placements, PIPEs (private investment in public equity), or venture capital financing. . 
Feldman (2006) documented several advantages offer by RM: 1) lower cost; 2) 
speedier process; 3) less time-consuming for company executives; 4) not dependent on 
IPO market and 5) underwriter unnecessary. In addition, he argued that PIPE is an 
important way of financing for RM firms as "...PIPE investors such as hedge funds are 
often able to lock in gains on PIPE investments as a result of favorable deal terms and 
short selling regardless of how the company's stock performs post-deal". The PIPE is not 
an option for private firms to financing. However, the RM opens up a PIPE option for 
6
 Feldman (2006) and Sjostrom (2008) point out that the Reverse Triangular Merger can avoid the time and 
expense involved in obtaining approval from the shell firms' shareholders, as well as those associated with 
SEC filings. Feldman (2006) points out that another advantage is that a Reverse Triangular Merger does not 
change any of the existing contracts associated with the operating company (i.e. private company) and thus 
leads to minimal disruption. 
7 See Feldman (2006). 
5 
• 8 
private firms who are small, not meeting the requirements of IPO listing but also in need 
of fund as greatly as IPO firms. 
Ill Reverse mergers as mergers 
Prior research has largely considered the reverse merger as an alternative way (as 
opposed to the IPO) of going public by which the "ready-to-go-public" private firm may 
obtain a public listing in a shorter time. Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) examine 
121 reverse merger cases and find little evidence of any improvements in operating 
performance following the merger. Further, only 46% of their sample survives two years 
after the reverse merger. It is important to note that their analysis benchmarks reverse 
mergers against IPOs. However, analyzing reverse mergers purely as a mechanism of 
going public may not provide us with the full picture for several reasons. 
First, there are several significant differences between an RM and an IPO in terms of 
the role of the investment bank. In an IPO, underwriters are involved in the issuance of 
the firm's security and they are authorized to manage the sale of securities to the public 
(Ritter, 2003). Underwriters and investment banks could play a key role in the process: in 
that 1) They assist IPO firms in deciding which kind(s) of securities are going to be 
issued (such as common stocks and preferred stocks)(Feldman, 2006); 2) They assist IPO 
firms in determining the issue price as well as the timing of the decision to issue 
securities. As a result, the reputations and efforts of underwriters and investment banks 
could influence the outcome of IPOs. 
8 See Sjostrom (2008) 
6 
Prior research confirms that investment banks play a significant role in an IPO. For 
example, Carter and Manaster (1990) argue that underwriters with higher prestige are 
associated with lower risk offerings. In addition, the efforts and prestige of underwriters, 
could affect the stock price performance even after the issuance. Carter, Dark and Singh 
(1998) found that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less 
short-run under-pricing and less severe long-term (3 year holding period) under-
performance. Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000) examine the aftermarket trading activity 
of underwriters and conclude that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market 
maker and that the lead underwriter continues to engage in stabilization activity for less 
successful IPOs and to make efforts to reduce risk. In contrast, investment banks or 
underwriters put little or no effort (as compared to IPOs) on RM transactions, and they 
appear to have no willingness or obligation to make an active secondary market for RM 
securities. 
Prior research on RM firms does not provide much evidence of support from 
investment banks. After RM firms obtain their public status, their shares are thinly traded 
(Ewing, 2000). A possible reason behind this illiquidity could be that no underwriter is 
involved in the RM and thus there is no "push" from the underwriter to activate a 
secondary market for RM firms (Sjostrom, 2008). In a similar spirit, James (2007) states 
that "...the shares of the public shell may not even be then currently trading on any 
securities exchange or quotation system". So, post-RM firms do not benefit as much as 
their IPO counterparts from investment bank support. Moreover, securities of post-RM 
firms are usually rated as "high in risk" and "low in investment value" by analysts, 
investors and financial institutions (Gleason, Jain and Rosenhal, 2005; Carpentier and 
7 
Suret, 2008). A possible reason is that unlike IPO firms, post-RM firms receive no 
underwriter certification (Gilson and Kraakman, 1984). 
Second, a reverse merger takes place through an exchange of shares while an IPO 
results in an infusion of funds into the firm that goes public. As suggested by Jensen 
(1986), an increase in free cash flow in the presence of the principal agent problems 
could lead to a decrease in firm value. This hypothesis has received some support from 
research on mergers as well as divestitures.9 
Third, different regulatory standards and requirements could be associated with the 
firm's accounting performance in the post-transaction period. IPO firms need to meet the 
requirements set by the stock exchange. However, a reverse merger bypasses such 
regulatory requirements and effectively allows some firms that do not meet such criteria 
to obtain access to the financial markets10. Evidence of this difference is provided by the 
work of Carpentier and Suret (2008) who examine a sample of Canadian reverse mergers 
and find that the lower disclosure and compliance requirements for these firms results in 
lower quality companies. They find that such firms are also more likely to delist over five 
or ten years following the RM. 
Fourth, many of the public firms that are acquired in a reverse merger report poor 
performance prior to the RM (Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins, 2005). The post-RM firm, 
similar to other firms involved in a merger, may face negative effects from structural 
reorganization and recapitalization. This is not a challenge for IPO firms. 
9
 See, for example, Harford (1999) and Allen and McConnell (1997) for evidence on the relationship 
between cash availability and value. 
10
 For example, NYSE sets standards those IPO firm needs to have minimum $2 million of earnings each of 
the 2 most recent years or $75 million revenues of the most recent fiscal year in order to get a public listing. 
However, the requirements for maintain an existing listing are not as stringent. 
8 
Finally, several researchers have pointed out the positive or negative synergies 
associated with mergers. For example, Gugler et. al. (2002) argue that conglomerate 
mergers decrease sales more than horizontal mergers and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) 
show that merger synergies are inversely related to prices. It is unclear to what extent 
such positive or negative synergies could affect a specific reverse merger. However, they 
could be the reason for systematic differences between reverse mergers and IPOs. 
IV. Hypothesis development 
Prior literature on reverse mergers has largely concluded that these transactions are 
poor performers, both in terms of accounting and stock returns. By comparing RM to 
IPOs, these studies come to the conclusion that the RM is a risky way of going public. 
For example, Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) suggest that RMs may fail to 
generate revenues; Gleason, Jain and Rosenthal (2005) find that RM firms are smaller 
and have lower levels of profitability as well as larger declines in profitability than 
comparable IPOs; Adjei et al. (2008) examine the issue of survival during the post-RM 
period and find that 42% of RMs are delisted within 3 years of listing on an exchange. In 
contrast, only 27% of similar IPO firms are delisted in the three years following the IPO. 
However, as I have argued, comparing reverse mergers to IPOs runs the risk of 
overlooking their role as mergers. Moreover, I would expect that private firms using RM 
gain short-run benefits otherwise they would not choose to undertake this process. Hence 
my null hypothesis is that: 
9 
HI: "The operating and stock price performance of RMs will not differ from those of 
regular mergers ". 
Another recognized issue in prior research is that the IPO generally is a relatively 
more time consuming and expensive process than the RM.11 Investment banking fees, the 
cost of underpricing on the first day of trading, and the time and cost related to SEC 
filings are all part of the IPO process. However, such cost could be reduced if private 
firms choose RMs as the mechanism of going public.12 As such, deal specific issues can 
be expected to influence the returns earned by RM participants. First, a lower 
requirement of senior management time is one of the potential benefits of a reverse 
merger. However, this benefit is eroded if the reverse merger process itself becomes 
complex and time consuming. As such, I would expect that the speed of completion 
would be related to the value of the firms undertaking a reverse merger. In addition, 
unlike for regular mergers, the ease of the process is one of the main criteria for deciding 
the success or otherwise of a reverse merger. As a result, although this concern should 
apply to all mergers, it is possible that this will be especially significant in reverse 
mergers. Second, Officer (2003) suggests that termination fees may influence merger 
outcomes. Termination fees could be used by managers of the target firm to prevent 
competition amongst bidders and thus allow them to lock in deals that enhance their 
private benefits. Alternatively, termination fees could be used as a mechanism to induce 
commitment and so facilitate the sharing of information, thereby increasing value for 
shareholders. To the extent that the termination fee and the time to completion are deal 
uSee, for example, Carpentier and Suret (2008) 
12
 See Ritter (1998), Feldman (2006) and James (2007) 
10 
specific characteristics, I contribute to the evidence on reverse mergers by examining 
their impact on target returns. In addition, I test whether the relationship between such 
deal characteristics and target returns differs between reverse mergers and regular 
mergers. Thus my second null hypothesis is: 
H2: "The speed of completion will not influence the value creation from a reverse 
merger; the importance of this factor will be no different for reverse mergers than for 
regular mergers. The termination fee associated with a reverse merger will be unrelated 
to the returns earned by the target. The relationship between the termination fee and the 
target returns will be the same for reverse mergers and regular mergers. " 
My third hypothesis concerns financing and capital structure. Ghosh and Jain (2000) 
find a significant increase in financial leverage following mergers and they show that 
announcement period market-adjusted returns are positively related to increases in 
financial leverage. I expect that private firms that undertake RMs do so, at least in part, to 
access the public financial markets. On the other hand, private firms before using RM 
also have the option to stay private. In a RM or GP transaction, the (private) acquirer has 
to choose the target and to examine target's financial position with respect to the effect it 
will have on the liquidity and leverage of the merged entity. In a GP transaction, the 
merged entity will have limited access to the capital markets and so the combined 
liquidity of the merged entity may be a more vital concern than in the case of RMs. 
Thus I have my third null hypothesis: 
H3: "RM targets and GP targets will not differ in terms of liquidity and leverage ". 
11 
V. Data Description 
I obtain my initial sample of Reverse Mergers from Securities Data Corporation's 
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisition database. I search SDC for all reverse merger 
transactions between 1995 and 2006 where: 1) Acquirers and targets are restricted to US 
firms; 2) Merger transactions involve one private firm and one public firm and the merger 
is initiated by the private firm; 3) The transaction is not a tender offer, a hostile merger, 
or a leveraged buyout and; 4) The transaction is completed13. 
However, SDC often defines RMs incorrectly, and this results in a bigger RM 
sample that incorrectly includes other kinds of firm combinations (e.g. rollups and regular 
acquisition). In addition, SDC sometimes reports the announcement date of a certain 
event inaccurately. For these reasons, I confirm my sample using data from proxy 
statements, 8-Ks and other related SEC filings from the EDGAR database as well as 
news releases obtained from Lexis-Nexis and Factiva. I also ensure that after the merger, 
the former private shareholders own more than 50% of the shares of the merged public 
entity. The exact date of announcement is verified through Lexis-Nexis and Factiva. My 
final sample consists of 171 reverse mergers. Of these I am able to find operating 
information for 146 firms from SEC filings and Compustat. Merging with stock price 
data from Center for Research in Stock Price (CRSP) reduces the sample size to 68. A 
possible reason why there are only 68 firms having price information available is that 
most of the RM firms are traded on the OTC or Pink Sheets after the merger, while CRSP 
13Typically, in a reverse merger, the former public board of directors appoints a new CEO for the new 
company who served as the former private firm's CEO and/or owns the private firm, and in some 
circumstances, several board members are introduced to the board of directors and most of them are from 
the private firm. Also, the newly combined firm normally abandons the public firm's name and takes the 
former private firm's name (although this step is not necessary to define a reverse merger). 
12 
only includes stocks that are traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges. 
Finally, I remove 4 firms in the financial services sector (SIC 6000 - 6999) leading to a 
final sample size of 64. 
Like RMs, GP transactions also involve one private firm and one public firm. This 
process is also undertaken through a merger or acquisition and shareholders of the private 
firm gain control of the post-GP firm. The major difference between GP and RM is that 
after merger the GP private acquiring firm stays private and the public target delists from 
the relevant stock exchange. Thus the public target firm becomes a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the private firm. To the extent that the major difference between these two 
kinds of transactions is in the listed (or unlisted) nature of the merged entity, a 
comparison with going private transactions may enable us to better understand the causes 
and consequences of reverse mergers. 
In order to analyze my sample against a comparable benchmark, I match my sample 
to similar regular mergers (the acquirers are matched although I provide comparisons for 
targets as well) and going-private transactions (only for targets). Unlike research on firms 
that go private, my study excludes those GP acquirers which are investors or shareholders 
and only examine cases where the GP acquirer is another firm. 
I match each acquirer in my sample of reverse mergers to an acquirer with the same 
2-digit SIC code, in the same year, and with the closest total assets that undertakes a 
regular merger. In a similar fashion, I match each target in my sample of reverse mergers 
to a target in a going private transaction. Thus I end up with three related samples of 
reverse mergers, regular mergers and going private transactions. 
13 
A potential shortcoming of the above matching approach is that I use the broad 2-
digit SIC definitions and therefore may end up with an imprecise match. In order to test 
for the robustness of my results, I replicate my entire analysis using samples matched by 
the 4-digit SIC code. In order to avoid losing a large part of my sample due to the tighter 
industry definition, I do not require that the matching transaction be in the same year. My 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. I also, replicate my tests for operating 
performance by including firms that have data available on Compustat but not on CRSP. 
Once again my results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Details for the full sample of 64 firms are provided in Table 1. As shown in Panel A, 
the most active years for RMs are after 199914. In Panel B, we report the distribution of 
the 4-digit SIC codes in our sample. The largest contribution comes from firms in the SIC 
codes 7000-7999 (computer hardware/software or internet related "high-tech" firms) 
which account for 29.7%, and the second and third largest are from firms with SIC codes 
3000-3999 (manufacturing firms) and 2000-2999 (manufacturers of household goods). 
VI. Methodology and Results 
6.1. Univariate analysis 
I first analyze the differences in the characteristics of acquirers and targets in the year 
prior to the merger to see whether there are significant difference between RMs, Regular 
14
 However, several reverse mergers after 1999 do not have CRPS data available. As a result, our final 
sample is more evenly distributed across years. 
14 
mergers and GPs. My results for the differences and the corresponding paired t-tests and 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are reported in Table 2. 
Panel A shows mean and median values for acquirers in RMs and regular mergers. 
Both types of acquirers are small firms with mean (median) total assets of $39.63 million 
($12.17 million) and $47.34 million ($40.07 million).15 Although the absolute values for 
the size are noticeably different, tests for size difference indicate that there is no 
significant difference between the two types of acquirers. 
I find that the difference in the return on assets (ROA, measured as the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets), is only moderately significant in 10% 
level for mean and not significant for median. The result is consistent with prior findings 
where they also find no difference or little difference in pre-merger profitability (Adjei et 
al. (2008), Aydogdu et al. (2008), and Gleason et al (2005)). Further, the lack of a 
significant difference in pre-merger ROA suggests that my subsequent comparisons of 
post merger changes in operating performance will not be overly influenced by mean-
reversion in measures of operating performance.16 Table 2 also reports a comparison of 
leverage and liquidity for my sample. I find that there is significant difference between 
acquirers in different groups. In the year prior to transaction, RM acquirers have less cash 
and equivalents but more debt than their regular M&A counterparts (both significant at 
the 1% level for mean and median). 
15
 This result is not surprising because we constructed the matching regular M&A firms by Total assets and 
SIC. 
16
 See Barber and Lyon (1997) for potential biases in measurement of operating performance when pre-
event operating performance is unusually high or low. 
15 
Table 2 Panel B reports similar descriptive statistics for targets in RM, regular 
mergers and GP transactions and provides tests of differences between the three groups. 
The targets are larger than their acquirers (however, unreported t-tests and Wilcoxon tests 
suggest that the difference is not significant). Also, I find similar results in terms of 
profitability as acquirers. All types of targets have negative ROAs but RM targets are 
significantly poorer in their performance than the other two groups. RM targets also hold 
significantly less cash than regular merger targets and significantly less cash than GP 
targets. As for the leverage, RM targets have more debt than M&A targets17. However, 
RM targets have lower levels of leverage than GP targets (again significant at 1% level). 
The results till this point suggest that the differences in operating performance, 
liquidity and leverage could be related to the choice between RMs and GP transaction. I 
further explore this possibility in the following sections. 
6.2. Multivariate logit analysis 
At the time of acquisition of a public firm by a private one, the acquirer has the 
choice of retaining the private status (i.e. going private transaction) or going public 
(reverse merger). This decision could influence the choice of the target as well as the way 
the transaction is carried out. In order to better understand this decision I run a logistic 
regression, 
17
 A possible reason is that firms closer to financial distress may have more debt than others. Gleason et. al 
(2005) found evidence that the Altman's Z (a distress proxy) is correlated with profitability (ROA and 
ROE). 
16 
p(RM or GoPrivt) 
= a + pxDealV + P20wnershvp + (33Size+/34Profit+(]4Profit + psCash 
+ p6Leverage 
Where DealV is the deal value of the reverse merger or going private transaction, 
Ownership is the percentage of new company shares held by former private firms 
(acquirers), Size is measured by the log of total assets at the time of the transaction, 
Profit is measured by ROA, Cash is the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets 
(which proxies for liquidity) while Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. In 
addition, I also examine the relationship between each two of the above variables by 
constructing the correlation matrix which is shown in Table 3. 
The results for several alternative specifications are reported in Table 4. The 
coefficient estimate for Log (Deal Value) is negative and significant, while the 
coefficient estimate for Ownership is positive and significant. Taken together, they 
suggest that reverse mergers involve relatively larger acquirers targeting relatively 
smaller firms. 
The coefficient estimates for the level of cash holdings of the target are negative and 
significant, suggesting that RM targets have less cash than comparable GP targets. 
Together with the observed positive coefficient for Log (Deal Value), this indicates that 
the need for funds, or lack thereof, could be one of the determinants of the choice to go 
private. The acquisition of a large target with significant cash holdings can result in an 
indirect infusion of cash for the acquirer. As a result, GP acquirers may not have as much 
need to access the capital markets and may therefore not find it as useful to be publicly 
17 
listed. In contrast, RM acquirers that acquire small targets with low cash holdings will not 
gain any significant amounts of cash from the transaction. Therefore, acquirers in RMs 
may need to access the capital markets soon after the merger and could conceivably 
perceive greater value in remaining a publicly listed entity. Consistent with this idea, the 
coefficient estimate for leverage is positive indicating lower unused debt capacity in the 
target. However the level of significance is sensitive to the regression specification. 
6.3. Event Study 
6.3.1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Following Brown and Warner (1985), I use daily stock returns and an estimation 
period from day -210 to day -10, relative to event date to estimate the parameters for the 
market model. I use the estimated parameters to compute the abnormal returns over the 
(-1, 1), (0, 0), and the (-5, 5) event windows for all groups of public firms in my sample 
(these consist of the targets in RM and GP transactions and the acquirers as well as 
targets for regular mergers). In addition, Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2007) suggest that 
1 o 
under certain conditions , the CAR computed using the market model may be biased and 
a more accurate result can be obtained by using the market returns as benchmark. The 
results are similar when I use the two approaches. 
In Table 5, I examine the short-run market reaction to the three types of merger 
transactions. Panel A reports the abnormal returns earned by various groups of firms 
18
 As noted by Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2007), the presence of frequent acquirers in a sample may 
suggest a high probability of other acquisition announcements during the estimation period. As a result, any 
abnormal returns caused by these announcements will bias the parameter estimates. 
18 
while panel B examines potential differences between returns earned by these groups of 
firms. Consistent with prior merger literature, targets appear to earn positive returns while 
acquirers earn close to zero abnormal returns. 19 For the (0, 0) window, the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for RM targets are 8.4% and significantly different 
from zero. The returns are even larger and more significant for the (-1, +1) and (-5, +5) 
• 9 f t 
windows. The median CAR for event date (0, 0) is somewhat smaller at 0.7% and not 
statistically significantly different from zero. However, the median returns for the larger 
(-5, +5) and (-1, +1) window are 5.6% and 9.4% and significant at the 5% level. Overall, 
targets in reverse mergers and going private transactions appear to earn higher returns 
than do their counterparts in regular mergers. For reverse mergers, it is possible that the 
private acquirer is willing to pay a premium for the benefit of being able to access the 
financial markets post-merger and this leads to a higher announcement return for the 
public target. However, the comparison of RM targets with GP targets does not yield any 
definite conclusions. I report similar results using market adjusted returns in Table 6. The 
results are similar to those in Table 5. 
Two factors may account for the difference in CAR between GP and regular M&A. 
First, my results are consistent with the findings of Weir et al (2005) who find that firms 
that go private are relatively undervalued compared to firms that do not. To the extent, 
that there is a potentially greater increase in value from going private for a certain group 
of firms, they would be more likely to be candidates for GP transactions and as a result 
earn higher abnormal returns upon announcement of the GP transaction. Second, Gleason, 
19
 See, for example, Jensen and Ruback (1983), Huang and Walkling (1987) and Jarrel, Brickley and Netter 
(1988). 
20
 These are using the CRSP equally-weighted market index. The counterparts using the CRSP value 
weighted index are similar and also reported in Table 5. 
19 
Payne and Wiggenhorn (2007) find that that certain public firms can benefit from going 
private and thus avoiding the higher costs of being public due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of2002. 
6.3.2. Multivariate regression on CARs 
Following Gleason, Jain and Rosenthal (2005), I define (-1, 1) CARs as a dependent 
variable and regress it on firm and deal characteristics to better understand the factors that 
influence the returns earned by targets in RM, GP and regular mergers.211 report these 
results in Table 7. 
The independent variables include Termination Fee, Deal Value, Duration, 
Ownership, Size (Total Assets and Sales), ROA, Cash (to total assets) and Debt (to total 
assets). Termination fee is the amount of the charge (in million US dollars) on a party 
who terminates the merger transaction prior to the effective date; Duration is the number 
of days between announcement date and effective date of the transaction. The remaining 
variables are as defined in Table 4 and all variables are also defined in the Appendix. 
For reverse mergers, the abnormal returns earned by the target are negatively 
associated with termination fees. Officer (2003) suggests two ways in which termination 
fees could be related to merger outcomes. First, Termination fees could be used to lock in 
"sweetheart deals" for the target managers and so could be detrimental to the interests of 
the target shareholders. Alternatively, termination fees could be used as a mechanism to 
induce commitment and so facilitate the sharing of information, thereby increasing value 
21
 We drop certain variables in Regular M&A and in GP models because of the non-availability of data. 
for shareholders. My findings suggest that unlike for regular mergers, termination fees 
are negatively associated with target returns. 
I find that Deal Value is negatively and Ownership positively associated with 
abnormal returns. Taken together, they suggest that higher returns for RM targets are 
observed when the acquirer is relatively large and the target relatively small. 
I find that Duration is negatively related to the abnormal returns. To the extent that 
the time between announcement and completion of a merger proxies for the complexity 
of the deal, it suggests that target shareholders earn higher returns when the completion 
of the deal faces fewer hurdles. However, the relationship is similar for regular mergers 
suggesting that this is no more an issue for RMs than it is for regular mergers. 
Finally, I find that the cash holdings of the target are positively related and the 
leverage of the target is negatively related to abnormal returns for GP transactions but not 
for RM or regular mergers. This suggests that the market values the higher liquidity in the 
target only in cases where the merged entity will not have access to the public financial 
markets after the merger. 
6.4. Post-event long-term analysis 
6.4.1. Buy-and-hold returns 
Similar to prior research, I measure long run performance using buy and hold 
abnormal returns benchmarked against a portfolio of matched firms and then test for 
21 
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robustness using a calendar time portfolio approach. I calculate the buy and hold returns 
(BHRs) using daily returns for post-event firms and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 





BHARit = BURgt - BHRjt 
Where 
Rgt = the return to stock i over day t 
Tg = end of holding period f or stock i 
j = the matching stock to stock i 
I define several holding periods which include 6, 12, 18, 24 and 36 months following 
the first day after the announcement of the merger. Because of various reasons 
(bankruptcy, acquisitions, etc.), the merged entity delists from stock exchanges as time 
goes on. I keep the active firms at the specified time period and calculate their BHRs. 
Table 8 reports the BHRs of RM firms and matching regular M&A firms for three 
years which I divide into 6 categories of 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 month periods following 
the merger announcement. I also report the BHAR for the same time periods. 
22
 See, for example, Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
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The results show that firms undertaking RMs significantly underperform the matched 
regular M&A counterparts in the long run except for the first 6 month period (using 
equal-weighted mean BHRs). I also compare median BHRs of the two samples, as the 
BHRs for both groups are characterized by skewness.23 The results for the medians are 
similar to those using the mean. 
The BHAR is negative for all time periods and significant for all except the first six 
months. Additionally, in unreported results, I find that over one-third (37.3%) of my full 
sample RM firms vanished within 3 years of going public. My results suggest that overall 
the RM firms perform poorly. To the extent that poor performance may preclude them 
from raising further funds from the market, my results are consistent with those of 
Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) who find that less than 20% of RMs raised 
capital via public offerings and that close to half the firms did not raise funds via public 
offerings or private placement. Further this consistency provides some evidence that the 
documented poor performance of RM firms may not have been influenced by the choice 
of IPOs rather than mergers as the benchmark. 
6.4.2. Fama-French Three factor regression 
For each trading day during the sample period, I form equally weighted portfolios of 
all sample firms that participated in the event (announcement of a reverse merger or 
regular merger) within the prior 3 years. Portfolios are rebalanced daily to drop all 
companies that reach the end of their 3-year period and add all companies that enter the 
23
 See Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) who investigated the distribution of long-run IPO returns. 
sample at that time. I also construct similar portfolios for 6-month, 12-month, 18-month 
24-month, and 30-month periods. 
Next I regress the dependent variable of portfolio excess return (Rpl ~ Rjt) on the 
three Fama and French (1993) factors, as described in the following equation: 
Rpt -Rft = a + P* (Rmt - Rft) + s * SMBt +fc * HMLt +spt 
Where Rmt is the return on the equally-weighted index in day t; R f t is the three-
month T-bill rate in day /; &pt is the return on the portfolio on day t\ SMBt i s the return 
of small-cap stocks minus the return of large-cap stocks on day t; and HML{ i s the return 
of high book-to-market stocks minus the return of low book-to-market stocks on day t. 
The regression yields parameter estimates of a , P , s and h. The error term in the 
regression is . I mainly focus on the parameter a as an estimate of the long run 
abnormal returns attributable to the event.24 
In Table 9 I report the results of time-series regressions of daily portfolio returns on 
three factors. Coefficients of a in comparison shows that RM firms underperform their 
regular M&A counterparts by, respectively, 2, 46, 28, 17, 29 and 8 basis points for 6, 12, 
18, 24, 30 and 36 month period. The differences are all statistically significant. However, 
the magnitude of the difference is fairly small. This result is consistent with my BHAR 
comparison which shows RM firms perform somewhat worse than regular M&A 
counterparts. Overall, although I find evidence of underperformance following RMs, the 
magnitude of the underperformance is small. My findings are similar to those of Gleason, 
24
 The results for this section do not use any bootstrap tests and are indicative in nature. 
Jain and Rosenthal (2005) who find that that the long run performance of RM firms is 
indistinguishable from those of IPOs. 
6.4.3. Accounting and operating analysis 
Following Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992)25, Gleason, Jain and Rosenthal (2005)26 
and Dechow (1994)27, I compare the operating performance (measure as the return on 
assets, ROA) for post-RM and post regular merger firms for the one year before and the 
two years after events. I compute all measures for the combined acquirer and target by 
adding the earnings for the two firms and dividing by the combined assets. I also look at 
the change in the liquidity of these firms by examining the cash to assets ratio (Cash) and 
the debt to assets ratio (Leverage). As with ROA, I report statistics for the combined 
acquirer and target. The event times are tabulated with reference to the effective date of 
the merger. I report the results in Table 10 as well as in Figures 1 and 2. 
In terms of operating performance, I observe that RM firms have poorer operating 
performance pre-merger. The mean and median ROA for a RM firm are significantly 
lower than their counterparts one year before the effective date of the merger. As pointed 
out by Barber and Lyon (1996), operating performance measures tend to revert to the 
mean. Therefore, I would expect that the difference would decrease over time. However, 
I find that the difference in ROA between RM firms and regular mergers widens from 
one year before to one year after the event. Thereafter, the difference shrinks. Overall, 
25
 Examined cash-flow returns (Cash-Flow margin) and found that merged firms outperform their 
industries. 
26
 Compared major accounting ratios for post-RM firms and post-IPO firms. 
27
 Investigated the features of widely used accounting ratios. 
RM firms appear to be poorer performing firms than their regular M&A counterparts. 
However, I am unable to find a clear trend in ROA of firms that undertake a RM when 
compared to a benchmark of similar firms undertaking a regular merger. 
In terms of liquidity, I observe that the mean (median) leverage for RM firms 
reduces from 45% (15%) one year before the merger to 13% (2%) two years after the 
merger. In contrast, the mean (median) level of cash held by firms involved in regular 
mergers decreases from 31% (27%) to 22% (13%). Overall, the results indicate that firms 
involved in reverse mergers experience a significant improvement in their liquidity 
position in the years surrounding the transaction. 
A potential concern for these results arises from the fact that prior research by Adjei 
et al. (2008) has found that a significant number of RM firms drop out within three years 
of the transaction. The results are consistent for my sample as well - I find that about 37% 
of my sample drops out within three years from the effective date of the merger. In order 
to address these concerns, I replicate my results in panel B using only the sample of firms 
that survive until the end of the second year. As can be seen, the conclusions remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
6.4.4. Equity and debt issues 
Our results till this point indicate that RMs involve poorly performing targets and 
poor operating and stock price performance for the combined entity. As such, it is unclear 
why some acquirers go through with these transactions. One possible reason is that the 
RM allows poorly performing firms a way to access the capital markets. As mentioned by 
Feldman (2006), this could include debt financing or factoring arrangements as well as 
private placements particularly in the form of private investment in public equity (PIPE), 
and venture capital financing.28 
In order to test whether a reverse merger, in fact, allows acquiring firms increased 
access to the capital markets, I examine the post RM issuance of debt and equity by the 
merged firm. I find that within 2 years after the RM, 28 of the 64 sample firms undertook 
public placements all of which involved equity financing. Similarly, 28 of the 64 sample 
firms undertook private placements of which 11 involved debt financing and 20 involved 
equity financing (3 of these firms issued debt as well as equity). It is possible that the 
remaining 8 RM entities did not require any immediate financing. Overall, my findings 
indicate a significant degree of fund raising activity of which a substantial portion occurs 
through private placement of debt and equity. 
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine firms that participate in reverse mergers. I examine the 
choice of targets in such transactions as well as the stock price and operating performance 
of the merged entity. Prior studies have contrasted the performance of reverse mergers 
with IPOs. My study differs in that I emphasize the merger aspect of the reverse merger. 
This allows me to provide a fresh perspective on this issue in two ways. First, I am able 
28
 For RM entities, private placements (sales of securities directly to individuals or institutional investors) 
are especially popular. However, share buyers must hold the purchased shares for at least one year unless a 
registration process is completed with SEC. PIPE financing is particularly advantageous in this respect as 
private placement can allow purchased shares to become tradable in as few as three months. 
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to analyze the deal characteristics of the merger and establish their importance in the 
performance of reverse mergers. Second, I provide alternative benchmarks - mergers and 
going private transactions - to measure the performance of reverse mergers. 
I find some evidence that deal characteristics such as the termination fee and the time 
to complete the transaction influence the abnormal returns earned at the time of reverse 
mergers. I also find that the size of the target and the acquirer influence the abnormal 
return. Reverse mergers appear to result in poor long term stock performance. However, 
the magnitude of the underperformance is small. In addition, there does not appear to be a 
clear deterioration in the operating performance due to the reverse merger. Overall, my 
results suggest that the choice of the benchmark matters and that the underperformance of 
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Figure 1 
Cash holdings of combined acquirer and target firms for reverse mergers and regular 
mergers. Years are measured in event time with year 0 referring to the effective year of 
the merger. 





Leverage for combined acquirer and target firms for reverse mergers and regular mergers. 
Years are measured in event time with year 0 referring to the effective year of the merger. 
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Table 10 
Sample descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Sample by Year 
No. of 
Year Reverse Merger Percent 
1995 5 7.81 
1996 4 6.25 
1997 14 21.88 
1998 3 4.69 
1999 12 18.75 
2000 3 4.69 
2001 5 7.81 
2002 4 6.25 
2003 4 6.25 
2004 5 7.81 
2005 5 7.81 
Total 64 100 
Panel B: Sample by SIC code 
Freq. of 
SIC Reverse Merger Percent 
1000-1999 6 9.38 
2000-2999 9 14.06 
3000-3999 18 28.13 
4000-4999 4 6.25 
5000-5999 3 4.69 
7000-7999 19 29.69 
8000-8999 5 7.81 
9000-9999 0 0 
Total 64 100 
The table shows the sample of the breakdown 
of 68 Reverse Merger by year in Panel A and 
by SIC code in Panel B. 
Table 10 
Firm and deal characteristics in year prior to going public 
Panel A: Mean (median) descriptive statistics for Acquirers 
Reverse Merger - Regular M&A - Tests in diff. Acquirer Acquirer 
Mean Mean T -statistic 
(Median) (Median) (Wilcoxon Z) 
Total Assets 39.63 47.34 -0.37 
($ millions) (12.171) (40.07) (-5.72)*** 
ROA -1.169 -0.045 -1.64* 
(-0.032) (0.042) (-0.89) 
Cash/Total Assets 
0.162 0.289 _ 3 7 3 * * * 
(0.226) (.3.43)*** (0.057) 
Debt/Total Assets 
0.746 0.353 4.87*** 
(0.187) (2.45)*** (0.264) 
1.30 1.673 -0.99 
Termination Fee (0.550) (-0.14) (0.500) 
173.761 100.140 0.87 
Deal Value (0.58) (35.59) (30.000) 
154.327 137.874 1.13 
Duration (128.000) (1.08) (141.000) 
0.717 0.813 -0.91 
Ownership (0.745) (0.827) (-0.79) 
No. 64 64 64 
Table 2 (continued) 












( l )vs. (2) ( l )vs. (3) 
Mean Mean Mean T -statistic T -statistic 
(Median) (Median) (Median) (Wilcoxon Z) (Wilcoxon Z) 
Total Assets 37.43 51.36 46.51 -1.61* -1.43* 
($ millions) (18.48) (31.58) (10.20) (-4.14) *** (-9.52) *** 
ROA 
-0.401 -0.101 -0.372 -4 73*** -1.87** 
(-0.081) (-0.011) (0.000) (-3.05)*** (-4.43)*** 
Cash/Total 0.221 0.349 0.481 -2.41** -2.89*** 
Assets (0.137) (0.344) (0.387) (-1.71)** (-4.36)*** 
Debt/Total 0.118 0.057 0.513 4 32*** -3 61*** 
Assets (0.024) (0.018) (0.404) (1.51) (-2.93)*** 
No. 64 64 64 
This table shows characteristics of RM firms and matching firms. The matching regular 
M&A and GP firms are selected under such criteria: the same sample period for matching 
firms as of RM firms and match the closest firms by Size (Total Assets), Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code and event year. 
Panel A shows univariate tests on different characteristics and comparison between RM 
acquirers and matching M&A acquirers. The last column reports T statistics and 
Wilcoxon Z value for mean difference and median difference respectively. 
Panel B presents univariate tests on different characteristics and comparison between RM 
targets and matching targets. The last two columns report T statistics and Wilcoxon Z 
value for the difference of mean and the difference of median respectively. 







Assets) ROA Cash Debt 
Log(Deal Value) 1 -0.074 0.549 0.059 0.021 -0.013 
Ownership 1 -0.371 -0.173 -0.061 -0.072 
Log(Total Assets) 1 0.539 -0.009 0.371 
ROA 1 -0.194 0.242 
Cash 1 -0.359 
Debt 1 
Table 9 
Logit regressions of transaction targets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.331 1.098 -1.149 -9.067 
(-0.99) (3 79)*** (-2.13)** (-31 37)*** 
Log (Deal Value) 
-0.349 -0.163 
(-6.19) *** (-3.38)** 
Ownership 3.610 16.037 
(1.89)** (49.13)*** 
Log (Total Assets) -0.425 -0.291 -0.117 
(-30.18)*** (-6.99)** (-1.38) 
Return on Assets -0.293 -0.013 0.061 -0.033 
(-3.99)*** (-0.02) (1.91)* (-0.04) 
Cash/Total Assets -2.672 -2.871 -1.916 -2.77 
(-26.38)*** (-32.46)*** (-9.34)*** (-19.30)*** 
Debt/Total Assets 0.331 0.169 0.091 
(4.13)*** (2.81)** (0.83) 
Likelihood Ratio 88.68*** 131.81*** 191.93*** 217.23*** 
Wald Chi-Square 48.91*** 94.34*** 121.71*** 79 95*** 
This table shows the Logit regression results. The dependent variable is RM = 1 and 
GP = 0. Transaction characteristics include: 1) Deal Veal which is the market value of 
exchanged stocks in a merger transaction reported in SDC and 2) Ownership which is 
the portion of shares of the merged entity owned by previous private shareholders 
Additionally, targets' characteristics include: 1) Size is measured by the natural log of 
total assets; 2) Profitability is measured by Return on Assets; 3) Cash liquidity is the 
ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets; 4) Leverage is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. All variables are in the year prior to event. Wald Chi-Square is shown in the 
parentheses. 
***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Panel A: CARs for different event window 
Announcement CAR Event Window 
(-1,+1) (-5,+5) (0, 0) 
VW EW VW EW VW EW 
(1)RM-Target 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.299*** 0.282*** 0.084** 0.083** 
(0.094)** (0.087)** (0.056)** (0.050)** (0.007) (0.009) 
(2)Regular 0.078** 0.080** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.056** 0.057** 
M&A - Target (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.045)*** (0.051)*** (0.003) (0.004)* 
(3)Going private 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.207*** 0.210*** 0.073** 0.068** 
- Target (0.167)** * (0.159)*** (0.090)** (0.095)** (0.101)*** (0.100)*** 
Panel B: Comparisons for different groups 
Comparisons CAR Event Window 
(-1,+D (-5,+5) (0, 0) 
VW EW VW EW VW EW 
( l ) - ( 2 ) 0.112* 0.108* 0.217*** 0.198*** 0.028 0.026 
(0.071) (0.063) (0.011) (-0.001) (-0.004) (-0.005) 
( l ) - ( 3 ) -0.006 -0.007 0.092* 0.072 0.011 0.015 
(-0.073) (-0.072) (-0.034) (-0.045) (-0.094)* (-0.091)* 
(2)-(3) -0.118* -0.115* -0.125** -0.126** -0.017 -0.011 
(-0.144)*** (-0.135)*** (-0.045) (-0.044) (-0.098)* (-0.096)* 
Panel A of this table presents the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for the (-1, +1), (0, 0) and (-5, +5) event period windows for the sample. The 
estimation period is (-210, -10). Both of CRSP value-weighed (EW) and equal-weighed 
(VW) index are used in the short-horizon event study. The ARs is calculated based on the 
CAPM market model and C A R = ( l+CARj . i )*( l+AR) and represents cumulative market 
model adjusted change over relevant event window. Panel B of this table shows differences 
in means and medians with medians in the parentheses. 
***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Robustness for Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Panel A: CARs for different event window 
Announcement CAR Event Window 
(-U+D (-5, +5) (0, 0) 
VW EW VW EW VW EW 
(l)Reverse 0 291*** 0.189*** 0.318*** 0.316** 0.082** 0.083** 
Merger - Target (0.008)* (0.007) (0.048)** (0.043)** (0.002)* (0.003)* 
(2)Regular 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.056** 0.054** 
M&A - Target (0.028)** (0.027)* (0.041)** (0.039)** (0.008)* (0.008)* 
(3)Going private 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.279*** 0.269*** 0.107** 0.108** 
- Target (0.145)*** (0.148)*** (0.096)*** (0.098)*** (0.131)*** (0.139)*** 
Panel B: Comparisons for different groups 
Comparison CAR Event Window 
T-test (-1,+D (-5,+5) (0, 0) 
(Wilcoxon Z) VW EW VW EW VW EW 
( l ) - ( 2 ) 0.112** 0.113** 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.026 0.029 
(-0.020) (-0.020) (-0.007) (0.004) (-0.006) (-0.005) 
( l ) - ( 3 ) 0.015 0.012 0.039 0.047 -0.025 -0.025 
(-0.137)** (-0.141)** (-0.048) (-0.055) (-0.129)** (-0.136)** 
(2)-(3) -0.097** -0.101** -0.203** -0.196** -0.051* -0.054* 
(-0.117)** (-0.121)** (-0.055)* (-0.059)* (-0.123)** (-0.131 )** 
Panel A of this table presents the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for the (-1, +1), (0, 0) and (-5, +5) event period windows for the sample. The 
estimation period is (-210, -10). Both of CRSP value-weighed (EW) and equal-weighed 
(VW) index are used in the short-horizon event study. The ARs is calculated based on 
market adjusted abnormal return AR; = R, - Rm and CAR; = (l+CARj_i)*(l+ARj) and 
represents cumulative market-adjusted change over relevant event window. Panel B of this 
table shows differences in means and medians with medians in the parentheses.. 
***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Multivariate regression of 3-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns 
RM - Target M & A - Target G P - Target 
CAR type EW VW EW VW EW VW 
Intercept -0.363 -0.430 0.479 0.510 0.435 0.441 
(-1.83)** (-1.81)** (3 19)*** (3.76)*** (1.91)** (1.98)** 
Termination Fee -0.193 -0.221 -0.026 -0.029 
(-1.85)** (-2.32)** (-1.12) (-1.22) 
Deal Value -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.001 0.001 
(-2.18)** (-3.67)*** (-0.08) (-0.19) (0.12) (0.14) 
Duration -0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.000 -0.000 
(-1.91)** (-1.95)** (-1.81)** (-1.93)** (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Ownership 1.063 1.079 0.169 -0.172 
(4.51)*** (3.72)*** (-0.67) (-0.89) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.010 -0.011 -0.059 -0.050 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.71) (-0.69) (-2.59)** (-2.67)** (-0.00) (-0.00) 
ROA -0.181 -0.179 0.123 0.127 -0.014 -0.013 
(-1.27) (-1.25) (0.57) (1.13) (-0.22) (-0.20) 
Cash/Total Assets -0.063 -0.083 0.121 0.116 0.941 0.946 
(-0.49) (-0.59) (0.86) (0.93) (2.26)** (2.35)** 
Debt/Total Assets -0.019 -0.018 0.056 0.043 -0.339 -0.332 
(-1.61)* (-1.53)* (1.31)* (1.58)* (-2.10)** (-1.99)** 
Adjusted i?-square 0.3750 0.3634 0.1864 0.1986 0.2158 0.2041 
F-Statistic 110.90*** 314.60*** 13 97*** 13.68*** 12.97 ** 
No. of observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 
This table shows the multivariate regression results. The dependent variables are the 3-
day (-1, +1) announcement period CARs (calculated by using CAPM model) for the 
sample RM targets and matching counterparts. Variables of deal characteristics in the 
multivariate regression include: 1) Termination fee which is the amount of the charge on 
a party who terminates the term of merger transaction in advance of effective date (in 
million US dollars); 2) Deal Value which is the market value of exchanged stocks in a 
merger transaction reported in SDC; 3) Duration which is the number of days between 
announcement date and effective date of the transaction, and 4) Ownership which is the 
percentage of merged entity's share held by previous private shareholders. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
****** represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Post-event return performance - BHRs and BHARs 
Period N BHRs BHARs BHARs 
(in months) RM M&A Mean diff t-statistic 
(median) (median) (Median diff) (Wilcoxon Z) 
6 64 0.010 0.019 -0.009 -0.32 
(0.008) (-0.011) (0.003) (0.13) 
12 57 -0.030 -0.018 -0.012 -2.09** 
(-0.032) (0.001) (-0.033) (-2.15)** 
18 46 -0.045 -0.011 -0.034 -1.73** 
(-0.047) (-0.004) (-0.043) (-2.15)** 
24 39 -0.036 -0.028 -0.008 -1.86** 
(-0.032) (-0.007) (-0.025) (-2.26)** 
30 35 -0.081 -0.009 -0.072 -3 97*** 
(-0.004) (-0.012) (0.008) (2.98)*** 
36 31 -0.048 -0.021 -0.027 -2.16** 
(-0.038) (-0.008) (-0.03) (-1.76)** 
This table shows the equally-weighed Buy-and-hold returns 
(BHRs) for post-event 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 month time 
period. BHRs for RM and matching M&A are reported in this 
table. 
Ti 
BHRit = + Rit) - 1 
t=2 
And the Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are 
calculated as the difference between RM and its matching 
M&A. 
BHARit = BHRit - BHR]t 
Where 
Rit = the return to stock i over day t 
Ti = end of holding period for stock i 
j = the matching stock to stock i 
T-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z (in parentheses) are reported for 
BHARs in the last column. 




Calendar - Time Portfolio Regression 
Rpt ~ Rft = a + P{Rmt - R f t ) + sSMBr + hHMLt + spt 
Month Coefficient Estimates 
a b s h Adj. R2 
RM -0.0131 0.0073 0.0091 0.0037 0.1003 
(-59.31)*** (25.13)*** (21.45)*** (6.37)*** 
M&A -0.0129 0.0772 0.0096 0.0013 0.1636 
(-61.39)*** (27.50)*** (26.01)*** (3.06)*** 
Comparison -0.0002 -0.0699 -0.0005 0.0024 0.1899 
(-2.39)*** (-3.36)*** (-0.88) (1.44)* 
RM -0.0188 0.0393 0.0022 -0.0006 0.1475 
(-113.54)*** (1.93)** (8.31)*** (-1.62)* 
M&A -0.0142 0.0727 0.0089 0.0008 0.2764 
(-66.59)*** (26.78)*** (23.48)*** (1.73)** 
Comparison -0.0046 -0.0423 -0.0062 -0.0002 0.1713 
(-8.19)*** (-0.98) (-4.06)*** (-0.86) 
RM -0.0179 0.0486 0.0018 -0.0011 0.2901 
(-97.96)*** (2.23)** (5.59)*** (-2.90)*** 
M&A -0.0141 0.0764 0.0092 -0.0004 0.2159 
(-68.57)*** (30.51)*** (25.57)*** (-0.95) 
Comparison -0.0028 -0.0215 -0.0079 -0.0009 0.2521 
(-18.23)*** (-2.03)** (-1.98)** (-3.36)*** 
RM -0.0155 0.0783 0.0019 0.0007 0.1983 
(-97.66)*** (4.37)*** (7.07)*** (2.00)** 
M&A -0.0138 0.0760 0.0090 -0.0009 0.1391 
(-69.29)*** (13.81)*** (26.41)*** (-2.19)** 
Comparison -0.0017 0.0023 -0.0072 0.0001 0.2144 
(-3.87)*** (0.41) (-0.78) (1.26) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Month Coefficient Estimates 
a b s h Adj. R2 
30 RM -0.0164 0.0358 0.0010 -0.0007 0.1952 
(-87.89)*** (1.81)** (3.35)*** (-1.86)** 
M&A -0.0133 0.0750 0.0095 0.0015 0.1682 
(-61.30)*** (29.40)*** (24.80)*** (3.24)*** 
Comparison -0.0029 -0.0367 -0.0075 -0.0022 0.1239 
(-3.45)*** (-0.68) (-2.14)** (-0.44) 
36 RM -0.0139 0.0404 0.0011 -0.0009 0.2137 
(-64.21)*** (1.75)** (2.86)*** (-2.24)** 
M&A -0.0131 0.0763 0.0097 -0.0015 0.1349 
(-60.05)*** (29.73)*** (26.53)*** (-2.15)** 
Comparison -0.0008 -0.0321 -0.0083 0.0010 0.1409 
(-2.78)*** (-0.45) (-0.08) (1.99)** 
This table reports the coefficients of Fama-French three factor regression. Rmt is the 
return on the equally-weighted index in day t\ fyt is the three-month T-bill rate in day t\ 
is the return on the equally-weighted portfolio (which is constructed as a portfolio 
consisting all the trading stocks in my sample on a specific date, t); SMBt js the return of 
small-cap stocks minus the return of large-cap stocks; and HMLt i$ the return of high 
book-to-market stocks minus the return of low book-to-market stocks. The regression 
yields parameter a, b, s, h, which are estimates of a , ft , 5 and h respectively. The factor 
definitions are described in Fama et al. (1993). The dependent variables in regression 
"comparisons" are the portfolio excess return (Rpt - Rft). Portfolios are constructed 
equally-weighted. T-statistics are in parentheses. 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Financing activities after RM 
Number of firms Number of firms 
within one year within two year 
Public financing 10 28 
Bond Issues 0 0 
Equity Issues 10 28 
Private Financing 14 28 
Bond issues only 5 11 
Equity issues only 12 20 
Bond and Equity issues 3 3 
Total Issuances 24 56 
This table reports the number of firms that undertook financing 
activities after reverser merger. The public financing refers to 
raising fund through public offerings - equity or debt; while the 
private financing refers to raising fund through individuals or 
institutions, PIPE financings and other types of private 
placements. 
Appendix A 
Description of variables 
Variables Description 
Total Assets The sum of current and long assets by company 
ROA Return on Total assets, defined as earnings before interest and 
taxes divided by total assets 
Termination Fee 
the amount of the charge on a party who terminates the term of 
merger transaction in advance of effective date (in million US 
dollars) 
Deal Value The market value of exchanged stocks in a merger transaction 
reported in SDC 
Ownership The portion of shares of the merged entity owned by previous private shareholders 
Duration Days between announcement date and effective date of a merger 
Liquidity Debt to Total assets 
Profitability Cash to Total assets 
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